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5 figuresAbstract
Economic forces shape the behavior of individuals and institutions.  Forces affecting
individual behavior are attitudes about payoffs (gains and losses) and beliefs about outcomes
(risk and ambiguity).  Under risk, the likelihoods of alternative outcomes are fully known.  Under
ambiguity, these likelihoods are unknown.  In our experiment, payoffs and outcomes were
manipulated independently during a classical choice task as brain activity was measured with
positron emission tomography (PET).  Here, we show that attitudes about payoffs and beliefs
about the likelihood of outcomes exhibit interaction effects both behaviorally and neurally.
Participants are risk-averse in gains and risk-seeking in losses; they are ambiguity-averse in both
gains and losses.  Two neural substrates for choice surfaced in the interaction between attitudes
and beliefs:  a dorsomedial neocortical system and a ventromedial system..  This finding reveals
that the brain does not honor a prevalent assumption of economics – the independence of the
evaluations of payoffs and outcomes. The demonstration of a relationship between brain activity
and observed economic choice attests to the feasibility of a neuroeconomic decision science.3
Introduction
A gamble with known payoffs with a well-defined probability distribution is termed risky
(Ellsberg, 1961; Knight, 1921).  In contrast, a gamble with known payoffs with probabilities that
are not well-defined is termed ambiguous.
1  Risk-avoiding in gains, risk-seeking in losses, and
ambiguity-avoiding are prototypical findings in decision-making research on choice behavior
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Curley, Yates, and Abrams, 1986; Cohen, Jaffray, and Said,
1987).
To assess the degree of risk-avoiding (seeking), participants were asked to choose between
two risky gambles (the risk condition, Figure 1A).  The participant’s task was to choose between
gambles.  The gamble on the left is posed as a container with 30 red, 30 blue, and 30 yellow
marbles.  The numbers below the arrows indicate that every red and blue marble is worth $30 and
every yellow marble is worth nothing.  The gamble on the right is posed as a container with 30
red, 30 blue, and 30 yellow marbles.  Every red marble is worth $50, every blue $6, and every
yellow $4.  The two gambles have the same expected value
2 but different spreads (variance in
payoffs).  We use spread as our ad hoc index of riskiness, with greater spreads reflecting greater
                                                
1 We characterize ambiguity as lack of knowledge of the distribution of outcomes.  Like  Ellsberg (1961), we
operationalize ambiguity by not telling subjects how many balls of each color are in an urn (different colors payoff
different amounts if drawn.)  Others characterize  ambiguity as a probability distribution on the possible color
composition of the urn (Howard, 1992).  Ambiguous settings have been characterized as settings in which the
competence of the decision maker is challenged (Heath and Tversky, 1991).  For a more complete discussion of
ambiguity see Camerer and Weber (1992).
2   Expected value (EV) is defined as the sum of the products of the payoffs and their probabilities.  Here the EV
of the gamble on the left is (30*$30+30*$30+30*$0)/(30+30+30) = $20 and the EV of the gamble on the right is
(30*$50+30*$6+30*$4)/(30+30+30) = $20.4
risk.  For example, the gamble on the left of Figure 1A has the smaller spread (30 – 0 < 50 – 4)
and is considered less risky.  A participant who prefers the gamble with the smaller spread (given
a choice between a pair of risky gambles with the same expected value), e.g., the gamble on the
left in Figure 1A, is said to avoid risk.
To assess the degree of ambiguity-avoiding (seeking), participants were asked to choose
between an ambiguous gamble and a risky gamble (the ambiguity condition, Figure 1B).  In the
example shown in Figure 1B, the gamble on the left is posed by a container with 30 red marbles,
each worth $30, and 60 blue and yellow marbles. While each red and blue marble is known to be
worth $30, and each yellow marble is known to be worth nothing, the precise numbers of blue
and yellow marbles are not known.  There could be as many as 60 blue (yellow) marbles, as few
as none, or any number in between (with the numbers of blue and yellow summing to 60).  This
intrinsic lack of knowledge about the distribution of marbles (payoffs) exemplifies ambiguity.
The risky gamble in the ambiguity condition (on the right side of Figure 1B) is identical to
that on the right side of Figure 1A (the risk condition).  This replication allowed us to assess
ambiguity avoidance using the assumption of transitivity.  For example, a participant who prefers
the gamble on the left in the risky condition, but who does not prefer its ambiguous counterpart
(like that on the left in Figure 1B), is said to avoid ambiguity.
 3
                                                
3 We employ the term ambiguity avoidance as it has typically been studied in experiments.  See e.g. Curley and
Yates (1985).  Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) employ a more restrictive definition than we have used here.  The
operationalization of their definition would mean that our test be augmented by an additional subject comparison in
which the Blue and Yellow balls on the ambiguous gamble are interchanged.  From a traditional psychological
standpoint this is equivalent to saying that the subject is indifferent between labels.5
Inspection of Figures 1A and 1B reveals that the only differences visually between the risk
and ambiguity conditions are the substitution of the 60 for the pair of 30's, and the presence of
diagonal rather than vertical arrows connecting the numbers representing payoffs and their
likelihoods.  These minimal changes were intended to capture the difference between risk and
ambiguity but to avoid wholesale visual contrasts that might generate a confound in the PET
images.  The full set of stimuli is available as supplementary material from the corresponding
author.
In our experiment, for each choice between gambles posing gains (the ambiguity-gains, AG,
and risk-gains, RG, conditions), there was an equivalent choice between gambles posing losses
(conditions AL and RL).  The stimuli in the loss conditions were identical to those in Figures 1A
and 1B with the addition of minus signs (-) in the row of numbers representing payoffs.  This
manipulation allowed us to distinguish risk-seeking (avoiding) under gains (losses), as well as
ambiguity-seeking (avoiding) under gains (losses).  In the discussion to follow, AG refers to the
ambiguous condition posing gains (like that shown in Figure 1B), AL refers to the ambiguous
condition posing losses, RG refers to the risk condition posing gains (like that shown in Figure
1A), and RL refers to the risk condition posing losses.
Methods
Human Participants.  Nine healthy, right-handed medical students (3 females and 6 males
with a mean age of 27 years, s.d. 3 years) participated in the study.  The volunteers gave written
informed consent according to guidelines of the University of Minnesota Institutional Review
Board and the VA Radioactive Drug Research Committee.  Medical students were chosen6
because their familiarity with medical equipment was expected to minimize confounds that might
be introduced by the PET imaging environment.
Task Paradigm.  After reading the instructions to participants and engaging in a series of
practice trials, a participant received an initial endowment of $190 cash.  The endowment was
held in the left (non-dominant) hand while the participant was in the PET scanner.  The stimuli
and task emulated and extended Ellsberg’s paradigm (Ellsberg, 1961) in which participants had
to indicate from which of two containers, each containing a total 90 red, blue, and yellow
marbles, they would rather draw a marble at random.  Participants saw four task conditions:  risk
gains (RG, Figure 1A), and risk losses (RL), ambiguity gains (AG, Figure 1B), and ambiguity
losses (AL).  (There were also several additional conditions, e.g., certainty, resting with eyes
closed, that are extraneous for this paper.)  Conditions were presented in random order across
participants.  Each experimental condition consisted of 27 choice pairs presented in random
order.  Ambiguous stimuli were on the left of each pair.
After all scans had been conducted, one of the gains trials was chosen at random.  The gamble
chosen by the participant for that trial during the scan was played with real marbles in a metal
urn.  Similarly, one loss trial was randomly chosen and the gamble chosen by the participant was
played.  The participant inspected the urn to verify its contents and then held the urn above the
experimenter's head while the experimenter selected a marble.  The colors of the selected
marbles, one from a gains trial and one from a losses trial, determined the participant’s additional
gain and loss.  The participant's total payoff was the initial endowment of $190 plus any
additional gain less any loss.  On average, participants earned $193 (s.d. $20).7
Several features of the task paradigm are noteworthy:  a randomized block design; an absence
of feedback following each trial (and a lack of varying wealth effects); a link between
performance and feedback at the end of the study; a possibility for participants to provide a
preference or a lack thereof; and the use of the participant’s choices in the determination of
additional gains and losses.
Imaging.  rCBF was estimated from tissue radioactivity (after correction with measured two-
dimensional attenuation) using a Siemens ECAT 953B scanner (Knoxville, TN USA) with septae
retracted, i.e., three-dimensional acquisition (Silbersweig, Stern, Frith et al., 1993).  An arm vein
was used for access.  The participant’s head position was stabilized with a vacuum-molded
pillow.  A slow-bolus of H2
15O was injected intravenously (9.25 Mbq or 0.25 mCi/kg initially,
infused at a constant speed over 30 s).  Data acquisition (correcting for random decay and
electronic deadtime only) commenced for 90 s upon arrival of activity into the head as evidenced
by consistently rising true counts.  Each experimental scan contained data from one type of
gamble, e.g., AG vs. RG (i.e., block design).  Interscan interval was about 10 minutes.  Images
were reconstructed by filtered backprojection including non-orthogonal angles to a final image
resolution of 10 mm full-width at half-maximum.
Analysis.  Image analysis was performed using software provided by S. Minoshima
(Minoshima, Koeppe, Mintun et al., 1993; Minoshima, Koeppe, Frey et al., 1994).  Data were
normalized to whole-brain average blood flow;  image fiducials were used to localize the
intercommissural plane;  images were coregistered;  anatomical standardization followed
nonlinear transformation into a standard stereotaxic space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988).8
Voxel-by-voxel statistics (z-scores) were computed as the difference in condition means divided
by the adjusted pooled standard deviation.
Omnibus tests of image z-scores contrasting rCBF across experimental conditions were
performed by counting the number of voxels significant at a 0.005 threshold (using a two-tailed
significance test).  The tests determined the likelihood of observing that number of
suprathreshold voxels given the null hypothesis of no difference between the conditions
compared in the contrast.  Because of the lack of independence of voxel-wise measures of rCBF,
both the number of significant voxels and the total number of voxels in the whole brain were
adjusted to an equivalent number of independent voxels.  Testing for significant differences of
brain activity between scans (omnibus changes) followed that in Worsley et al. (1995).  Several
standard atlases were use to determine anatomical designations and approximate Brodmann areas
(Talairach and Tournoux, 1988; Schmahmann, Doyon, Holmes et al., 1997; Öngur and Price,
2000).
Results
The behavioral data (choices made) in the four experimental conditions are summarized in
Figure 2.  The graph shows the proportion of ambiguity-avoiding (and seeking) choices in AG
and AL conditions and the proportion of risk-avoiding choices in the RG and RL conditions.
Participants avoided ambiguity under both gains and losses; they also avoided the riskier (higher
variance) gamble under gains, but sought the riskier gamble under losses.  This result converges
with the choice behavior in numerous experiments (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Curley et al.,
1986; Cohen et al., 1987; Tversky and Fox, 1995; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  A chi-square9
test indicates that the interaction in choice performance between belief structure (risk, ambiguity)
and payoff structure (gains, losses) is significant at the 0.001 level.
In addition to classifying observable behavior into risk and ambiguity preferences, we used
positron emission tomography (PET) and a tracer (H2
15O) to estimate regional cerebral blood
flow (rCBF, a standard indicator for brain activity).  The contrasts in brain activity between
gains/losses and ambiguity/risk conditions, and their interaction, were calculated voxel-wise
4
after anatomical standardization across participants. In Figures 3 and 4, we show those voxels in
both tails of the distribution. A standard magnetic resonance image (MRI), warped into
stereotactic space, shows the structure of the brain in gray scale.  The color scale indicates the
relative amount of brain activation in terms of z-score:  highest activation is coded in white (z-
score > 4.7);  the lowest activation in the figure corresponds to the threshold, z-score > 1.8,
shown in green.  The omnibus test yields 45 effective voxels, both independent and significant at
the 0.005 level.  There are 1,905 effective voxels for the whole brain; the null hypothesis of no
interaction within the brain is rejected at the (10)
-6 level.
The pattern of rCBF enlisted by the interaction between belief structure (ambiguity or risk)
and payoff structure (gains or losses) is shown in Figures 3a and 4a.  This interaction was
computed as the voxel-wise difference in brain activity during choice behavior across all four
conditions expressed as a compound difference between (1) ambiguity and risk, and (2) losses
and gains, i.e., [(RG – RL) – (AG – AL)].  Figure 3a shows the activation/deactivation of a
ventromedial network associated with the gain loss difference in risky gambles  that is not
                                                
4   A ‘voxel’ is the volumetric equivalent of the more familiar ‘pixel.’  Here, a voxel represents a volume of brain
in stereotactic space (2.25 mm on each side).10
present in the gains loss difference under ambiguity, and Figure 4a shows the
activation/deactivation of a dorsomedial network  with the loss gain difference in risky gambles
that is not present in the gain loss difference under ambiguity.
 The behavioral graph aids us in interpreting the brain phenomena.  We note that the
difference in observed behavior between AL and AG is small (0.05, see figure 2) while the
difference between RL and RG is large (0.80).  In examining brain activation the difference
between theses differences (RL-RG)-(AL-AG) is large.  Figures 3b and 3c show the components
of this difference separately [i.e., (RL – RG) and (AL – AG)].  Examination of Figure 3 reveals a
pattern similar to that seen in the behavioral data:  most of the interaction effect is driven by the
difference in risk conditions (Figure 3b), with very little contribution by the difference in
ambiguity conditions (Figure 3c).  A similar phenomenon exists for the dorsal network (Figure
4).  In Figure 5 we examine areas of greater activation under AL than RL (AL-RL; 5a) and
greater activation under RL than AL. (RL-AL; 5b).  The result reveals a ventromedial network
for ambiguity and a dorsomedial network for risk in the contrast under losses.
The pattern of activation and deactivation seen in Figures 3-5 is the neural counterpart of the
behavioral interaction seen in Figure 2.  This study is among the first of its kind to identify the
patterns of neuronal activity that support observed human choice behavior.
Tables 1 and 2 display the brain regions, approximate Brodmann areas, locations (in Talairach
stereotactic coordinates), and significance levels of voxels isolated by the interaction between
belief structure and payoff structure.  The robust ventromedial network (in the medial portion of
the base of the brain), highlighted in Figure 3a, includes phylogenetically older cortices (Table
1).  These regions tie into structures such as the amygdala and hypothalamus that process11
emotion and the internal milieu.  Clinical pathologic and neuropsychological studies have already
suggested the critical role of the orbital gyrus and ventromedial prefrontal cortices in human
emotion, decision making, and evaluation of outcomes (Öngur and Price, 2000; Breiter, Aharon,
Kahneman et al., 2001; Damasio, 1999).  The dorsomedial network (at the top of the head near
the midline), highlighted in Figure 4a, contains phylogenetically newer cortices that may
represent specialization for processing of risk in decision making, Table 2.  An extensive
literature supports that these regions can reflect components relevant to visual and spatial
representation (e.g., precuneus, parietal lobe), to calculation procedures (e.g., parietal lobe,
cerebellum), and to executive processes (e.g., dorsal prefrontal cortex).  Thus are consistent with
the interpretation that the RL condition generates more calculations and comparisons when
contrasted with RG, AG, and AL.  More comparisons divert activation away from the
ventromedial area.
Discussion
This study is concerned with choices between gambles which payoff in dollars, the
fundamental concern of experimental economics and a salient topic in decision making.  Our
analyses indicate that the interaction between belief structure (ambiguity/risk) and payoff
structure (gain/loss) shapes the distribution of brain activity during choice.  A simple
manipulation of belief structure and payoff structure produces focal activations and deactivations
that suggest two disparate, but functionally integrated, choice systems with sensitivity to loss:  a
neocortical dorsomedial system related to loss processing when evaluating risky gambles, and a
more primitive ventromedial system related to processing of other stimuli.  This anatomy
suggests that choice under loss generates more use of the calculational part of the brain and12
diminishes the role of visceral representations in the ventromedial system which appear to be
present under the other conditions, risk gain, ambiguity gain and ambiguity loss.  The
ventromedial system arose phylogenetically earlier and likely supports decision making in
animals without more developed neocortices
 The present findings complement and extend the recent findings of Breiter et al. (2001), who
mapped hemodynamic responses to the expectation and experience of monetary rewards and
losses.  Except for some overlap in frontal poles and orbital cortex, the neural regions are
strikingly different between these two studies as might be expected given the differences in
experimental design.  We focused upon isolating brain regions critical in the choice process per
se, while Breiter et al. specifically excluded the choice process in their design.  Our subjects did
not experience feedback about outcomes; they knew that their outcome would be determined at
the end of the study by a random draw from their past choices.  Finally, the contribution of
expectancy is minimized in the present study through its absence in the ambiguity condition as
well as cancellation in the interaction effect.
These two studies highlight distinct processes and anatomy relevant to decision making.  It
appears from Breiter et al. (2001) that structures relevant to expectancy and the experience of
outcomes are ventral brain structures including bilateral orbitofrontal cortices (with more anterior
predominance); amygdala; sublenticular extended amygdala; nucleus accumbens; hypothalamus;
and ventral tegmentum.  In contrast, systems most closely tied to the choice process per se are
medial with ventral vs. dorsal distribution depending upon the knowledge structure and payoff
structure.  The ventromedial orbital regions associated with ambiguity processing under loss
show a more posterior distribution than those related to the processing of prospects.13
In both economics and decision theory, it is generally assumed that belief structure and payoff
structure are separable, if not independent.  This study shows that they interact to reveal two
dissociable choice systems.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. (a)  A sample stimulus for a pair of risky gambles posing gains (condition RG).  The
groups of squares, numbers, and arrows indicate the distribution of red, blue, and yellow marbles
in two containers.  The numbers below the arrows signify the payoff in dollars of each of the
marbles at the arrowhead.  After an initial endorsement of $190 cash, the participant’s task is to
choose the container from which one marble would be drawn.  The gamble on the left has the
lower payoff variance and is considered to be less risky.  (B)  A sample stimulus contrasting an
ambiguous gamble (on the left) and a risky gamble posing gains (condition AG).  The slanted
arrows indicate there is a total of 60 blue and yellow marbles in the ambiguous gamble.  The
precise numbers of blue and yellow are not known.  The risky gamble is identical to that shown
in Figure 1a.
Figure 2.  The interaction in choice behavior between knowledge structure (risk, ambiguity) and
payoff structure (gains, losses).  The plotted points indicate the percentage difference between
risk (ambiguity)-avoiding and risk (ambiguity)-seeking choices in the four conditions.  The
behavioral difference is greater under risk (80%) than ambiguity (5%) and the sign of the
difference changes for losses but not for gains.  Because the distance between RG and RL is
much greater than the distance between AG and AL, we predict that we will be able to uncover
significant brain activation in examining the contrast between scans RG-RL and scans AG-AL.
R: risk; A: ambiguity; G: gains; L: losses.
Figure 3. The top row (a) shows brain locations differentially activated by the contrast between
gain vs. loss under risk, compared to gain vs. loss under ambiguity, [(RG – RL) – (AG – AL)],
revealing a ventromedial network.  (b)  The risk component is largely responsible for the18
interaction.  (c)  The ambiguity component plays a lesser role.  R: risk; A: ambiguity; G: gains; L:
losses.
Figure 4.  The top row (a) shows brain locations differentially activated by the contrast between
loss vs. gain under risk, compared to loss vs. gain under ambiguity, [(RL – RG) – (AL – AG)],
revealing a dorsomedial network. (b)  The risk component is largely responsible for the
interaction.  (c)  The ambiguity component plays a lesser role.  R: risk; A: ambiguity; G: gains; L:
losses.
Figure 5.  Alternative components of the interaction effect.  The top row (a) shows brain
locations differentially activated by the contrast between ambiguity vs. risk under loss (AL –
RL), revealing a ventromedial network.  The bottom row (b) shows brain locations differentially
activated by the contrast between risk vs. ambiguity under loss (RL - AL), revealing a
dorsomedial network.  R: risk; A: ambiguity; G: gains; L: losses.19
Table 1.  Regions, locations, and magnitudes (expressed as Z-scores > 3.3) in the interaction
between beliefs (risk, R; ambiguity, A) and payoffs (gains, G; losses, L):  [(RG – RL) – (AG –
AL)].
Brain Region Brodmann
Area
XY Zz -
score
Orbitofrontal 13b -17 23 -16 5.2
Gyrus rectus 14c -8 10 -18 4.9
Medial orbitofrontal 10m,r 12 37 -20 4.8
Intraparietal sulcus 7 24 -51 52 4.7
Frontal pole∗ 10p -15 64 -11 4.4
Brainstem, pons 6 -28 -32 3.7
Frontal pole 10p -44 55 9 3.6
Inferior frontal gyrus 47/12m 33 19 -14 3.6
Inferior frontal gyrus 47/12m,l 26 12 -20 3.4
Entorhinal cortex 28 19 5 -27 3.4
Parietal lobe 7/40 26 -40 52 3.3
*  Asterisk indicates a focus on the edge of the brain that could be artifactual.  Caution is
appropriate when considering this region.20
Table 2.  Regions, locations, and magnitudes (expressed as Z-scores > 3.3) in the interaction
between beliefs (risk R, ambiguity A) and payoffs (gains G, losses L):  [(RL – RG) – (AL –
AG)].
Brain Region Brodmann
Area
XY Zz -
score
Cerebellum VIIB/VIIIA -35 -58 -45 5.1
Middle temporal gyrus 21 -48 -1 -20 4.5
Superior frontal gyrus 6 -21 5 56 4.4
Paracentral lobule 5 -6 -40 54 4.4
Temporal pole∗ 38 -33 17 -32 4.3
Pre-SMA 6 6 12 56 4.1
Vermis VIIB 3 -69 -27 3.9
Precuneus 7 -6 -49 32 3.9
Inferior parietal lobe 39/40 -44 -60 43 3.8
Precuneus 7/31 -1 -55 36 3.6
Vermis Cr I 30 -76 -34 3.5
*  Asterisk indicates a focus on the edge of the brain that could be artifactual.  Caution is
appropriate when considering this region.